Introduction
Oil shocks have been explained by episodes of unrest (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016) , supply and demand (Kilian, 2009) , monopoly power (Mankiw, 2014) , and by money supply growth (Alquist et al., 2013) . There is a lack of consensus especially about the 2009-2014 oil price "shock". For example, unrest and monopoly power theses are countered by US oil fracking creating a tremendous oil supply increase during the 2009-2014 period.
The monetary hypothesis is intriguing since Alquist et. al (2013) show that the US CPI in ‡ation rate, the US monetary base and the US M1 monetary aggregate all Granger (1969) predict oil prices with a post-WWII data sample ending in 2009. These results stand in contrast to Hamilton's famous (1983) results that no macroeconomic series Granger predicts oil prices; but this is not surprising in that Hamilton' Formally the Swaps are counted as a part of the US monetary base.
1 But since the Swaps were a temporary measure for the bank liquidity crisis, rather than part of in ‡ation-pressure inducing reserve increases, we calculated the monetary aggregates with these Swaps subtracted out. As Bordo et al. (2014) Section 2 describes the literature and some empirical trends. Section 3 provides the data sources, Section 4 presents the econometric methodology and data testing, and Section 5 the results. Section 6 o¤ers some discussion, and Section 7 concludes.
Literature and Empirical Facts
Subtracting out the Swaps is similar in spirit perhaps to how Lucas and Nicolini (2015) use an adjusted M1 to …nd a stable money demand function. They expand the de…nition of M1, which they call M1MMDA, by taking money market deposit accounts from M2 and adding them to M1. Here we also are focusing in on what is the relevant monetary aggregate, in our case, to see whether monetary factors help explain oil prices.
A monetary theory of oil shocks was presented descriptively by Barsky and Kilian (2004) for the 1970's. Using data up to 2006, Gillman and Nakov (2009) Alquist et al. (2013) show robustness of these causality …nds from in ‡ation to oil prices, using data from 1975 to 2009, and also show Granger predictability of M1 to oil prices. = 0:013; or a 1.3% average annual in ‡ation rate. These form four markedly di¤erent "regimes". The …rst three are broadly shadowed by the monetary base; the fourth and last one is not.
Given the seeming graphical comovement of oil and gold prices, Figure 4 shows that this series, starting with the FRED data for gold in 1968, looks somewhat like random noise. It may be that a nominal story can be told for some movements in the series, or the opposite type of thesis, that of relative price changes from supply or demand shifts, may apply. As an extension, this oil/gold price is also tested for nominal causality. [Insert Figure 5 here] Figure 6 shows the Swaps themselves. Though the magnitude of the Swaps themselves is small, they caused reserves to rise when oil prices were crashing along with other asset prices. Subtracting these Swaps back out, on the basis of their use for stemming a panic 
Testing Methodology and Data Properties
The testing methodology is similar to Hamilton (1983) , Gillman and Nakov (2009) and Alquist, Kilian and Vigfusson (2013) , as based on Granger (1969) . This involves estimating a VAR model of the following form:
Then X is said to Granger-cause Y if Y can be better predicted using the histories of both X and Y than it can by using the history of Y alone. This reduces to testing the null
The test requires that X and Y to be stationary or of the same order of integration. To determine the order of integration, we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots. Should X and Y be integrated of the same order, the series are di¤erentiated so as to become stationary. If integrated one order higher that their "pairs", we follow instead the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to test for Granger-causality, as described by Giles (2011) . All series for all variables and subperiods proved to be integrated of order 1 (I(1)), except for the CPIE (CPI without energy prices), and the EXP5Y and EXPMICH in ‡ation expectations variables, which are I(2). We apply standard Granger (1969) causality tests to all the I(1) pairs of series, and the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to test for causality of the I(2) series on I(1) series. Table 1 While the MB aggregate includes reserves, the M1 aggregate does not. So we constructed an aggregate by adding the monetary base to demand deposits (MB+DEMDEP), which is M1 plus reserves. This aggregate showed Granger predictability for one period, the full sample, while subtracting Swaps from this aggregate (MB-SWP+DEMDEP) results in Granger predictability in all but one subperiod, as in other narrow aggregates minus Swaps.
Results
In Table 1 , broader aggregates show no Granger predictability, in terms of M2, M2-SWP, M2-Divisia and M2-Divisia minus Swaps. Granger predictability by in ‡ation indices of oil prices is reported for the CPI minus Energy prices (CPIE) for most of the subperiods, and without reverse causality after 2008 and in other periods. For the regular CPI (for all urban consumers), there is Granger predictability for the Start of the sample up to 2008, without to Real Oil Start Full Sample 1973 -2017 1975 -2017 1991 -2017 Start-2008m9 2008m10-2017 The comovement of oil and gold prices seen in Figure 1 suggests also examining the Granger predictability by nominal factors on real gold prices. Table 2 shows to Real Gold Start Full Sample 1973 -2017 1975 -2017 1991 -2017 Start-2008m9 2008m10-2017 MB 1950 The nominal in ‡uence on both oil and gold prices, suggests an alternative way of normalizing the nominal oil price. Instead of dividing the dollar oil price by the US CPI, the dollar oil price is divided by dollar gold price. The causality testing of this alternatively normalized oil price is presented in Table 3 .
Results are similar to the tests on oil prices alone with some results from the gold prices also appearing. Granger predictability is found for in ‡ation expectation in a way almost identical to the oil price …ndings. For all of the Granger predictability …ndings in Table 3 for the 2008-2017 sample, in the last column, no reverse causality is found. 4 Table 4 presents some further 4 Note that the starting date for the gold price is 1950, as compared to 1946 for oil; probably the di¤erence 13 extensions. Table 4 
Discussion
The results show signi…cant evidence of money supply, the CPI, and in ‡ation expectations
Granger predicting real oil prices. Also money supply growth Granger predicts in ‡ation, as has been found before (Haug and Dewald, 2012) . And money growth and in ‡ation predict international gold prices, the oil to gold price ratio, and the US dollar exchange rate index. This is a robust set of monetary facts that reinforce how nominal factors a¤ect oil prices.
The additional facts make clear that oil prices are e¤ected by monetary aggregates in a fashion related to other asset prices. Granger predictability is found for gold prices, by the M2 minus Swaps (M2-SWP) aggregate, with less robust results for narrower aggregates. In contrast, it is the narrower aggregates, of the monetary base minus Swaps (MB-SWP), M1
is negligible in that the US was on the Bretton Woods gold standard from 1946-1950. minus swaps (M1-SWP) and M1-Divisia minus Swaps, that Granger predict oil prices.
Gold is a bit di¤erent from oil in usage in that oil needs to be used much so for day to day production of output. Real gold prices appear to build in shorter term expectations of in ‡ation while the real oil prices build in both long and short run in ‡ation expectations. 
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper indicate how nominal factors Granger predict real oil prices including the Great Recession period and afterwards, once Swaps are subtracted from the aggregates. The results suggest that the post -2008 expansion of the monetary base increased in ‡ation expectations. In ‡ation expectations are found to predict oil prices, and the collapse of both in ‡ation expectations and oil prices in 2014 was coinciding.
The speculation from these results is that the 2009-2014 oil shock resulted because extra expected in ‡ation was built into oil prices until 2014, but the extra in ‡ation was not realized because of indirect "sterilization" of part of the monetary base through the holding of excess reserves. An important next step in this research is to use Kilian's (2009) 
